Substitutionalization of politics
As the regime of Putin’s personal power stays longer and becomes stronger Putin’s Russia becomes the state of more and more developed substitutions. They are aimed to replace democratic institutes functionally being at the same time absolutely dependent from the government without ability to act directly. Most of them are connected to the president personally and are not autonomous by their character, like mechanical prosthesis.

Substitutes, intended to replace institutional mechanisms which function badly, are created ad hoc to fix concrete separate problem and often have a single use character. That’s why there are numerous ‘special’ and ‘extraordinary’ adjectives in their names: a special representative, special forces, commissioners and ombudsmen. The basic feature of political substitutes is an absence of independent powers and of a mechanism of direct action. Being established most of all by presidential decrees and governmental regulations, substitutes unlike ‘living’ institutes are avoided of self-development capacity. However, being created once they do have huge bureaucratic inertia. In case of reuse they need a manual changeover.

In 2014-2017 the model of management in conditions of emergency was developing: the special collegium of judges (2014), special presidential envoys (2015-2016), Internet-ombudsman (2014), special order of considering criminal cases (2014), anti-crises headquarters in regions and anticorruption commissions (2015), special email for businessmen to appeal to the Prosecutor General (2016), the special system of monitoring and overseeing realization of citizens’ appeals to state authorities and self-administration bodies (2017). The whole system of management in result becomes more primitive due to centralization and tougher subordination with strengthening of state power verticals and local self-administration embedded.