The abstract for my paper is the following:

"Mass Repression and Political Loyalty: A Dual Legacy of Stalin's Famine in Ukraine"
(co-authored with Arturaz Rozenas, NYU)

States use repression to instill political loyalty, but repression -- and especially indiscriminate mass repression -- can also cause grievances, making citizens more willing to oppose the regime. Given this duality, what is the net impact of mass repression on political loyalty? To address this question, we study the short- and long-term political impact of famine in Soviet Ukraine in 1932-34, also known as Holodomor -- one of deadliest cases of mass repression in human history. Using detailed data on local famine losses, instrumented by a composition of weather shocks, we find that the famine induced short- and long-term behavioral loyalty, but only in the historical periods when Moscow exercised unambiguous political authority and was able to retain the credible threat of violence. However, the famine had the opposite effect when the state's political authority was weak or absent: in those cases, it produced significantly greater short- and long-term opposition to political forces associated with its onset.
This evidence suggests that mass repression can induce both compliance and opposition, depending on the state's capacity to renew violence.